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The subject of my paper is what Whitehead meant by "the eternal greatness 
incarnate in the passage of temporal fact,”1 and an effort to indicate its re­
levance to Buddhist thought. Obviously, the paper is not focused upon creative 
work in the arts and sciences about which so much writing is being done as 
one decade follows upon another in the present century. The focus is upon 
the creativity that transforms individuals and their experience by enriching 
the flow of quality and widening the range of their perceptive participation 
in the life of the world.
1 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), 
p. 41. Henceforth referred to as AL
2 Charles Hartshorne, Whitebead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935-1970 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 135. Henceforth referred to as WP.
3 Ibid.
4 Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 
108. Henceforth referred to as UW.
The sense of our being individual and unrepeatable actualities in a world 
where new increments of quality are forever being added is "the gift of 
aesthetic significance” that frees us from the limitations of any one occasion 
that happens in our lives.2 The feeling of these increments of quality is the 
feeling of the basic and unavoidable change in the ongoing of a dynamic world. 
It is simply "the becoming of ever-new events.”3
Creativity, the many, and the one are ultimate terms, presupposed by all 
other generalizing insights in Whitehead’s philosophy.4 It goes without saying 
that this process of creativity, which is called "the form of unity of the
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Universe,”5 is the source not only of all human good but of all human freedom 
as well. It is “the way of the world” with an ultimate momentum of its own. 
Any initial situation “with its creativity can be called ‘the actual world.’ ”6
5 Al, pp. 230-231.
« Ibid.
7 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, III.: The Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 4-5. Henceforth referred to as CSPM.
8 Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce Vol. vn, edited by Arthur W. Burks, (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pars. 538-540. Henceforth referred to as CPP. 
Cardinal numbers refer to paragraphs, not pages.
The freedom to which we have just referred is caught in the vocabulary we 
have all come to associate with Hartshorne, as in the following quote:
‘Creative’ means, as in Bergson’s ‘Creative Evolution,’ unpredict­
able, incompletely determined in advance by causal conditions and 
laws. Accordingly, it means additions to the definiteness of reality. Every 
effect is in some degree, however slight, an ‘emergent whole’.... As 
Bergson and Peirce insist, prediction is limited, not alone by igno­
rance, but by the very meaning of the future as a sphere of decisions 
yet unmade [occasioned by the emergence of new increments of 
quality yet to appear], issues not yet settled even by the totality 
of causes already operating. Reality is predictable just in so far as it 
is not creative, but rather mechanical, automatic, compulsive, habit- 
ridden. Much of life is thus uncreative and hence predictable.7
We are thus in immediate, momentary, unbroken contact with the creativity 
that drives the world, enriches life, and likewise constitutes the ultimate 
source of power in our lives. Peirce has his own way of making this focus clear, 
as a few lines will serve to suggest:
Every quality, every feeling is perfectly simple and irrespective 
of anything else... undivided, without parts.... Feeling is the con­
sciousness of a moment as it is in its singleness, without regard to its 
relations whether to its own elements or to anything else.8
This consciousness or awareness of a quality in the Present, as Peirce goes 
on to say, allows no time “for any inference at all, least of all for inference
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concerning that very instant,”9 hence for any inference that the power of quality 
in the moment is the feeling of an ego. The self as this American “Buddhist” 
says, is only inferred, along with other general ideas which he calls “living 
feelings spread out.”10
9 CPP. Vol. v, par. 462 (Eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; published in 1934 
and i960).
10 Ibid., Vol. Vi, par. 143.
11 Henry Nelson Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1946), p. 303.
12 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by A. Mitchell (New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1911), pp. 199-200.
13 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: G. P. Putnam’s & Sons, 
1928), p. 119, paperback edition; also The Free Press, paperback, 1968. Henceforth 
referred to as MT.
It is interesting to observe that all these Philosophers of Process, at variance 
in much that they think, nevertheless agree that the flow of quality through 
the neural networks of the live creature is the source of man’s vitality and 
power. Thirty years ago Wieman was observing as follows: “Quality is 
objective fact.... It is the substance of which all is made.... It is energy, but 
energy is quality to human experience, and that means ultimately and ab­
solutely for human living.”11 Most of us are apt to recall in this connection 
what Bergson was always saying about the ultimate momentum of life: “In 
the depths of our experience,” he writes, “at the point where we feel ourselves 
most intimately within our own life” the joy of a novel penetration “swells 
unceasingly with a present that is absolutely new,” conferring upon us our 
zest for living and freeing us from all that is merely repetitive, mechanical, 
stereotyped, and compulsive in our lives.12 Unless we feel these strands of 
energy, these new increments of emerging quality alive in us in each passing 
moment, we are out of touch with the ultimate source of our personal power, 
the power of qualities composing themselves in new forms of togetherness, 
which, as Whitehead puts it, “constitutes the drive of the universe.”13
In the light of what we have been saying, the reality of experience is marked 
by the sense of power, vitality, quality, freedom, and the self-active creativity 
with which everything begins. This is the reality that shows the difference 
between being aware of what is happening in one’s own feeling system and
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having no “really real” experience at all. The base line of human living is 
constituted by these vectors of quality. One of the early books of the Tripitaka 
refers to these infinitesimally small and unique increments of quality in the 
life-continuum as vibrating after or toward, or, more specifically, “vibrating 
with” (anukampati)™
At the risk of needless elaboration of the point, let us hear Hartshorne 
again on the ultimate momentum of life. “The unity of the momentary ex­
perience,” he said in a paper presented in i960 in the Personalist group 
meeting at the Eastern Division of the APA, “is taken as a primitive; there 
is no other unity from which it can be derived or by which it can be explained.” 
It is simply “the self-active experience.” Each experience is thus a feeling 
that incorporates within itself what may be happening now, or what may be 
only presented now through memory of earlier events. This is the only real 
unity, the wholeness of the momentary present, which may embrace its 
predecessors through memory and anticipate or intend something waiting to 
be realized in the future. This wholeness of the present moment is a “de­
cisive moment,” Hartshorne writes, a moment in which to become more 
fully alive and more vitally a participant in the “shared creative experience” 
that constitutes a world.14 5 And, as the same writer observed in his most 
recent book,
14 Samyutta-Nikaya, 105. Pali Text Society edition, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 131-132.
15 Charles Hartshorne, <cThe Structure of Givenness,” Tbe Pbiloiopbical Forum, 1960- 
1961, pp. 22-39.
16 CSPM, pp. xx-xxi.
The basic motivation ... is neither the appeal of a self for that 
same self; nor even the appeal of other selves for the own self. Rather, 
it is something more general and yet, in its instances, more specific or 
concrete: the appeal of life for life—thus my past or future life (or self) 
for my present life or self and also the appeal of your past or future 
life (or the lives of birds, or the cosmic life) for your or my present life, 
reality, or self. Apparently it was Buddha who discovered this, 
centuries before Christ, if I may so speak, rediscovered it.16
One of the very strange matters in the comparative study of civilizations 
is that the stream of life in which we are all embedded—the one that traces 
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its roots through the revolutions of modem science and technology, the 
French and American Revolutions, the Protestant Reformation, the Re­
naissance, the ferment of the late Middle Ages, the Roman Empire, the Greek 
city states, and Hebraic-Christian traditions—it is strange that this civiliza­
tion should have taken so long to become aware of its own compulsive passion 
for security and permanence in its affairs. Threatened almost constantly from 
barbarians without and anarchy within, this civilization seems to have been 
forced by its own volatile change, its amalgam of ethnic and linguistic groups, 
and other sources of disunity to use the power of intellect to impose order 
and social control. By way of contrast, the Buddhist perspective had con­
cluded twenty-five centuries ago that man has no other option than to 
participate as fully as possible in the Creativity that drives the world, in the 
fullness of the present moment, in the vivid flow of quality at the root of our 
individual awareness. While Western civilization was probing for something 
permanent in our experience, some “unknown substratum to which the 
qualities of experience do adhere,” the long Buddhist vision was transmitting 
its conclusion that the world that exists is the result of the non-txisttnu of such 
unknown independent substance. Buddhism was attending, awakening, be­
coming more fully and vividly aware of those “truly singular events” in which 
we experience “the varied wonder and splendor of this world.” As Herbert 
Guenther puts it, “creative forces” encountered forever as events interrelated 
in various changing forms, in flowers that bloom and birds that sing, are all 
that exists.17 Buddhism is centered in this kind of continuing analysis by 
individuals of their own “stream of experience” and “fleeting moments.” The 
17 Herbert Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology in the Abbidbarma (Berkeley: Shambhala, 
I974)> P* 241* The early Buddhist philosopher, Asanga, wrote this many centuries ago. 
Everyone at one time or another has come upon the quotation from Shwe Zan Aung, 
pages II-I2 of his translation of the Abbidbammatta-Sangaba, entitled Compendium of Philo­
sophy (London: Luzac & Co., Pali Text Society, 1956 cd.): “The Stream of Being... is 
an indispensable condition ... the sine qua non of present conscious existence; it is the 
raison (Petre of individual life; it is the life-continuum.” See also Gunapala Piyasena 
Malalasekera, “Aspects of Reality Taught by Theravada Buddhism,” in The Indian Mind, 
ed. by Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 77: “Thus the 
universe... represents an infinite number of discrete, evanescent elements in a state of 
ceaseless activity or commotion ... in a state of perpetual becoming.”
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whole of Buddhist thought is “permeated,” as Inada writes, with this concept 
of the momentariness in which we live (khana-pdtia/hana-pdda).i8 In methods 
of meditation and analysis, Buddhism sought to become more fully awake to 
the aesthetic richness Professor Malalasekera called “the fulfilled Now,” which 
Whitehead called “the aesthetic foundation of the world.”
18 Kenneth Inada, “Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach,” Philosophy East and
West, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (April 1974), pp. 171-173.
19 Abe Masao, “Review Article: Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions 
(Paul Tillich),” Eastern Buddhist, Vol. I, No. 1 (Sept. 1965), p. 114. Cf. also MT, p. 59.
20 Lama Anagarika Govinda, The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy 
(London: Rider & Co., 1961), pp. 56-57.
According to Buddhism, we miss our chance to live “the fulfilled Now” 
unless the quality of the momentary present can be synthesized to facilitate 
ever more encompassing streams of quality, leading us to be more free and 
full participants in the life we share with those who live, with those who 
have lived, and with those who will yet live. In such aesthetically consum- 
matory awareness, as Abe Masao says, everyone and everything is enriched 
without eliminating its differentiation. This, he continues, is “the living 
structure of Nirvana,” the free flow of living quality with no attachment to 
arrest the flow. Instead of obscuring or obliterating the differentiation of 
everyone and everything, as Buddhism has sometimes been thought to teach 
in its concept of Nirvana, we have an interaction between all entities in the 
interdependent cocreation of all, each individual becoming increasingly capable 
of synthesizing and assimilating the flashing qualities of the others. This may 
be what Whitehead had in mind in saying that each entity becomes increasingly 
capable of producing that particular effect which in all the universe no other 
entity could produce.19
One of the most provocative modem writers on Buddhism says that “it is 
precisely because of this living juxtaposition and succession of events in their 
momentariness that the possibility of becoming free” from our own distortions 
and distractions exists. Life, Govinda says, “knows only centres of relation, 
continuous processes of unification, because reality cannot be broken up into 
bits; therefore each of its phases is related to the others, thus excluding the 
extremes of identity or non-identity.”20 What Govinda means, and what
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Buddhism has emphasized throughout, is precisely what the major Process 
Philosopher now living has written: “For a philosophy of becoming,” Hart­
shorne writes in his most recent book, “basic terms like 'reality’, 'truth5, 
‘what there is’, the ‘universe5, 'what is going on5, really mean reality as of 
now, the truth now, what there is now, the universe now, what is going on 
now (as conditioned by what has already gone on)—or else they have no 
unambiguous meaning.”21 As everyone reading Hartshorne knows, creative 
synthesis is what is “going on” in these momentary nows. And this is what 
the Buddhists for centuries have been saying, as Hartshorne insists in the 
following way:
« CSPM, p. 17.
22 CSPM, p. 8.
23 Guy Richard Welbon, Tbe Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 304.
Experience of emergent synthesis feeds on its own previous pro­
ducts, and on nothing else whatever! This is the ‘ultimacy5 of crea­
tivity.
Sharing of creativity is the social character of experience, its 
aspect of sympathy, participation, identification with others. More­
over, even one’s own past self is, strictly speaking, ‘another5—as 
hundreds of thousands of Buddhists have, for over a score of centuries, 
been trying to tell the world. I hold that in this they have simply 
been accurate. One can regard one’s past self with love, but also 
with antipathy, much as one can the selves of other persons. Sheer 
identity or sheer non-identity cannot be the correct account of this 
matter.22
In his recent inquiry into Western interpreters of Nirvana, Welbon confirms 
what we have been saying, that “creativity pervades both the way and the 
goal of Buddhism,” and that “ignoring its presence would be to imperil any 
attempt to understand the Buddhist nirvana” as well as to ignore the one 
unambiguous distinction between Buddhism and Hinduism.23 Much earlier, 
Mrs. Rhys Davids was concluding that the early Buddhists were “groping” 
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and “feeling out” that “dynamic conception of things,” that world of “be­
coming, movement, process, sequence, force,” which is found in all the 
interpretations of modem science.24
24 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1903), p. 588.
25 WP, p. 135.
26 Govinda, op. at., p. 57.
No one, of course, would expect the terminology of a radically different sym­
bolic system and culture world to have a one-to-one relation with our own, and 
we reserve until later the question as to how far modem Process Philosophers 
and Buddhism in, for example, Nagarjuna, may be employing reason in 
different ways. It is commonly agreed, however, that the creativity which is 
the most general feature of reality in Process Thought is asserted by Buddhist 
writers most profoundly in the concept of “conditioned genesis,” “dependent 
origination,” or what Nakamura and Suzuki prefer to call “the interrelated­
ness of all things.” All things exist interdependently, and “all change is made 
intelligible as the becoming or creation of events.... Such is Whitehead’s or 
the Buddhists’ view.”25
The familiar formula in Buddhism is pratitya-samutpada^ or paticca-tamuppada. 
As Govinda writes, it “shows itself as the necessary counterpart of the anatta- 
idea which emphasizes the character of existence and conceives the individual 
from the standpoint of life and growth, in contrast to the fossilized concept 
of an absolute entity which would logically call for similarly absolute (life­
less) laws.”26 Actualities of the moment are novel, interrelated but always 
expressing some novel enrichment of experience.
As this familiar formula suggests, society is more fundamental in the 
Buddhist orientation than substance, a feature associated with all Process 
Thought. Nothing has a self-established nature (yvabhavd) either beyond or 
above or within the stream of events; there is no unconditioned substance or 
substratum, no soul or self or Being, or Nature, or Universe-at-large, or 
Truth from which the qualities we experience and analyze flow. The most 
famous illustration in Buddhist literature occurs in a collection of dialogues 
between a Buddhist sage, Nagasena, and King Menander, one of Alexander’s 
successors and sovereign of northwest India in the second century B.c. In 
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the document entitled, “Questions of King Milinda,” Nagasena tells the 
king that the chariot is made up of wheels and axle and other parts, just as a 
house or army or tree or city are likewise societies of elements disposed toward 
one another in the unity of function. If you infer a chariot behind the parts, 
and a similar entity behind a man or a house, you must infer such an entity 
behind every individual thing.27 The same point has been made again and 
again by major philosophers since Plato. As Whitehead put it, “There is no 
going behind actual entities to find anything more real.”28
27 Quoted in Louis de la Vallfe Poussin, The Way to Nirvana (Cambridge: The Univer­
sity Press, 1917), pp. 42-43. Comments by Milindapaiiba, and reactions
of modem scholars arc given.
28 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), 
pp. 27-28. Henceforth referred to as PR.
29 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an Introduc­
tion by Charles W. Hendcl (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 194.
Hume’s way of putting Nagasena’s point is the best-known statement in 
Western thought. Speaking of the author of his earlier Treatise in the third 
person, Hume writes in the Inquiry as follows: “He asserts that the soul, as far 
as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions— 
those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations—all united 
together but without any perfect simplicity of identity.”29 Despite all his 
efforts, Hume was unable to persuade his readers that, in seeking to free our 
experience from the “propensity to feign” a soul or personal substratum, he 
was substituting a new navigational system for the direction of life. Con­
ventionalized cliches and doctrines would no longer function as a mariner’s 
compass; neither these nor the intellectual residue of a lifetime of habitual 
responses to one’s rearing. I once wrote an essay, which promptly dropped 
from sight, on the possibility that, considering his relations with Adam 
Smith and his knowledge of Francis Hutcheson, Hume was trying to induce 
men and women to open their feeling systems to the free flow of quality 
always emerging in Hume’s backgammon and in the shared creative ex­
perience of which Hartshorne writes. To base life in the matrix of inter­
personal relations in which we meet and care and mutually create the qualities 
that enrich our experience seemed to Hume’s own philosophical descendants 
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an effort to turn the work of the intellect upside down.30 Peirce, Whitehead, 
and Hartshorne all take up Hume’s point, as I see it, but with more positive 
and recent resources, clarifying what may be called the Buddhist side. “Person­
al identity through experiences,” Hartshorne writes, “is a property of the 
experiences, they are not properties of the identity, or of the ego.... Ego­
centric motivations essentially consist in metaphysical confusion.”31 This is 
precisely what the Buddha said. The fundamental element in our experience 
is a process of appropriating and synthesizing from many directions the 
“stream” or continuum of life. According to Buddhism, we become more 
intelligent, deliberate, responsible participants in this process in the course 
of discovering this deeper stream of existence. What we discover along all 
our vectors and parameters is what Whitehead referred to as “the eternal 
greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact.”32
30 Nolan Pliny Jacobson, “The Uses of Reason in Religion: A Note on David Hume,” 
Journal ofRdigion, Vol. xxxix, No. 2 (April 1959), pp- 102-110. See also Vol. XL, No. 2 
(April i960) for a discussion of this article by two philosophers. Cf. “Hume on the Uses 
of Reason in Religion,” Ilijf Rtvitw, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Spring 1958), pp. 49-59-
31 Charles Hartshorne, “Introduction,” in Douglas Browning, ed., Philosophers of Process 
(New York: Random House, 1965), pp. xii, xix. The question of Gautama Buddha 
acquires fresh relevance in this context: “Which, now, is thy true self, that of yesterday, 
that of today, or that of tomorrow, for the preservation of which thou dost clamor?” 
Quoted in Paul Carus, TA* Gospel of Buddha (Chicago; The Open Court Publishing Co.,
1894), pp. 138-139. Our personal pronouns refer to processes of “point instants” as all 
Buddhist philosophers have argued. In an essay on personal identity, Hartshorne com­
ments as follows: “Perhaps at long last we should join the Buddhists in recognizing” that 
“an enduring individual is a society or sequence of occasions.” In “Personal Identity from 
A to Z,” Process Studies, Vol. n, No. 3 (Fall 1972), p. 214.
33 Al, p. 41. Also supra, p. 1.
33 CSPM, p. 224.
In the Buddhist concept of conditioned genesis, each determinate event 
inherits along innumerable lines and synthesizes the qualities of the organic 
unity that is the momentary now. Each such actuality is dependent upon its 
predecessor or contemporary (dependent origination) but independent of 
events that follow in any series. “The adult must have been a child, the 
child may or may not become an adult.... Our knowing Plato relates us to 
Plato, not Plato to us.”33 Every individual is the shepherd, therefore, of many 
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lives, those contemporary with his own, those stretching backward into an 
unbroken process out of the past, and those who will yet become in the future. 
This is why Buddhism has been called the perspective of “infinite com­
passion”—there is no other way than perceiving oneself a participant in all 
that lives, or has lived, or will live. Once illusions are swept away, “the 
immanence of the past” is found “energizing in the present.”34 Human 
occasions or “cells of experience” do not inherit in a one-dimensional personal 
order alone, since each occasion is “broken into by innumerable inheritances 
through other avenues,”35 the illustration nearest us being our bodies whose 
functionings are occasions of energy transference from physical nature stretch­
ing into the environment at large.36 Early Buddhism placed this kind of 
emphasis upon the role of the human body. Life for the Buddhist becomes 
meaningless, indeed, only when, beginning with his life in the body, his 
widening participation in the stream of becoming “comes to a dead end.”37 
“To be and to remain alive we must not allow ourselves to be carried into 
some shallow back-water.”38 Unless we perceive these manifold lines of in­
heritance, and unless we feel this creative matrix of energy alive in us each 
moment, we are out of touch with what is “really real” in our existence. Tbe 
reality of experience is marked by tbe sense of quality and power with which it begins. 
The problem here is that it takes rigorous efforts in meditation, according to 
Buddhism, to heighten and intensify the qualitative richness of life.39
34 Al, p. 241.
35 Al, p. 243.
36 Al, p. 242-244. See also Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead (Boston: 
Little Brown & Co., 1954), pp. 152-153: “For ages we have had immense quantities of 
human experience accumulating in men’s bodies. The body itself was, and still is, an 
immense experience; the sheer harmony of its properly functioning organs gives us a 
flood of unconscious enjoyment. It is quite inarticulate, and doesn’t need to be articulate. 
But in bulk, and perhaps in significance, it far outweighs the scope of the written word. 
That, by comparison, is mostly trivial.” Henceforth referred to as DANW.
37 Guenther, op. cit.3 p. 134.
38 Ibid., p. 229.
39 Pituddhimagga V, pp. 12-20. Also Guenther, op. at., pp. 73, 134.
In the Buddhist view, this creative synthesizing of innumerable qualities 
present in the momentary now is a process for which, according to Nagarjuna, 
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we have “a living thirst.”40 In the work until recently thought to be his, 
Mabd-praftdpdramita-fdstra, the point is made that man, unlike other creatures, 
has a specific nature and is a determinate individual, but he is not confined 
to his determinate nature; he is not bound forever to his fragmentariness. He 
has a thirst to regain the dynamic, organic relatedness in which richness of 
life consists. “The height to which the Madhyamika would take us ultimate­
ly. .. is a comprehensive attitude where one takes interest in every little 
thing without being confined anywhere; for here one is aware of the place 
and function of everything... as well as of its ultimate meaning.”41 The 
basic truth Nagaijuna affirms is not a position of his own; it is one within 
the range of every individual who penetrates the fragments and determinate 
character of his life. Readers are warned “to set free the sense of the real from 
its moorings in abstractions.”42 This is why the power of the Buddhist attitude and 
perspective has depended, not upon its being intellectually explained, but rather upon its 
being practiced far from the printed page. The “enlightened” in Buddhism feels 
a zest for living; freed from habitual obstructions and distractions, he is in 
touch with the ultimate momentum of life. The problem here is not simply 
to discover a more valid philosophical structure upon which to perch. Only
40 Venkata Ramanan, Nd garj uno’s Philosophy: As Presented in the Mahd-PrajUdparamitd- 
Sdstra (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1966), p. 264. Cf. pp. 38 f., and 317. See pp. 
329-330 for the following: “Man is at crossroads. He is aware of the unconditioned and 
knows also the conditioned. With the unconditioned in his aim he has his concourse 
in ... the world of mundane existence. It is this sense of the unconditioned that acts as 
the very spring of all his activities, theoretic and practical.... The wise do not abandon 
things saying that these lead them to contradictions and conflict; they preserve these 
and abandon the roots of conflict, viz., ignorance and passion. Having abandoned these 
they freely use concepts, construct even conceptual systems if need be in order to root 
out conflict and suffering. Opposing statements do not land them in conflict for they are 
free from clinging. Suffering of life does not prompt them to abandon life; they live their 
lives putting an end to the root of suffering.” In this work now considered a later 
synthesis of his major ideas, Nagarjuna claims that he has no position of his own. The 
basic truth he affirms is in the range of every individual who penetrates the fragments 
and compulsive character of his life. Readers are invited to free themselves from their 
mooring in abstractions. Cf. also pp. 41-42, 247-248.
41 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
« Ibid.
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Buddhists penetrating the veiled features of their existence through medita­
tion and analysis can experience the ultimate momentum of their Eves as 
“flashes of reaEty” always outrunning their “grasp.”43 Reason in Buddhism 
has a chiefly evocative role. Properly Eved, “our Eves are passed,” as White- 
head puts it, “in the experience of disclosure,”44 a disclosure framed in the 
“vague totaEty” that haunts us with “the fullness of its existence.” Behind 
what we think is “that vast background of feeling hardly touched by con­
sciousness.”45
43 Nolan Pliny Jacobson, Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis (Carbondale, Hl.: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1970), Ch. iv.
44 MT, p. 62.
45 MT, p. 116.
46 Jay McDaniel and John B. Cobb, Jr., “Introduction: Conference on Mahayana 
Buddhism and Whitehead,” Pbilowpby East and West, Vol. xxv, No. 4 (October 1975), 
p. 395. For the Nagarjuna study, see K. Puhakka and R. Puligandla, “Nagarjuna and 
Maya,” The Middle Way, Vol. xliv, No. 2 (August 1974), p. 71.
There has been much misunderstanding of the role of conceptual thought 
in both Whitehead and Nagaijuna. Puhakka and PuEgandla are seeing the 
common ground here when they write of Nagaijuna that he is not only not 
opposed to system-building but sees conceptual systems as instruments for 
deepening understanding and the entire range of awareness. “Without reason 
guiding one’s inquiry, one cannot understand anything.” Nagaijuna cannot 
be characterized “by a thorough-going program of invalidating conceptual 
thought.”46 Nagarjuna is obviously using concepts with complete freedom, 
and advises others to do the same, even to construct conceptual systems, the 
only provision being that concepts are used to “root out conflict and suffer­
ing” and to enhance the unspeakable quaEtative richness of life. People who 
are “free from cEnging” and from compulsive drives can direct their theoretic 
activities in this way. The general thrust of Buddhism is not against reason 
in human experience but against ego-centered, culture-encapsulated reason. 
Creative theorizing can lead beyond all anthropomorphic perspectives into the 
clarification of what must be done to extend the range of awareness and 
awaken us to more of the fullness of existence. A Buddhist might have written 
the following remarks found in Wieman’s “Intellectual Autobiography”:
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The first step of religious commitment is repudiation of all belief 
and knowledge as ultimate source of security and value. The second 
step is the recognition that the ultimate source of security and value 
is the concrete fulness of quality, which is never identical with the 
structures by which we know it. The third step... is to seek knowl­
edge not for any ultimate security it can yield but as an instrument 
to guide conduct and disposition in dealing with that fulness of 
concrete reality which extends infinitely beyond the compass of 
knowledge.47
47 Henry Nelson Wieman, “Intellectual Autobiography,” p. 28, in Southern Illinois 
University Library Archives.
43 MT, pp. 108-113.
49 DANW, pp. 368-369.
50 MT, p. 113.
51 Henry Nelson Wieman, “The Religious Significance of Creative Interchange,” Iliff 
Review, Vol. xn, No. 2 (Spring 1955), p. 21.
It is difficult to see how anyone can read Whitehead and Buddhism without 
acknowledging that they are together on this; namely, that the whole notion 
that what is fundamental in our experience is well-defined must be “completely 
inverted” As Whitehead puts it, “the specialist in clarity sinks to an animal 
level—the hound for smell, the eagle for sight.”48 This is why Whitehead 
remarks that most of what is said with our conscious minds and speech “is 
shallow and superficial. Only at rare moments does that deeper and vaster 
world come through into the conscious thought or expression.”49 Concepts 
are artifacts to be literally “seen through,” and it is a “vicious regress,” 
Whitehead argues, “from the indefinite complexity of what is felt to attempt 
to control life, thought, communication, memory, and aspiration under the 
dictates of existing forms of understanding.”50 This is why Wieman, too, 
always argued regarding our interchange together that “the process simply 
is not creative in the sense here understood... whenever you manipulate 
interchange to produce an outcome which you had in mind from the start.”51
Every Buddhist philosopher in the past two thousand years would have 
had deep appreciation for the uses of reason Whitehead and Hartshorne ex­
plicitly state and exemplify in their work. They never forget that reflection 
and analysis are taking place amid “the creative advance of the world into 
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novelty.” As Lowe writes of Whitehead, the forms of understanding are 
presented “only as so many possibilities for realization in the flux of things— 
possible patterns of existence and possible ways of feeling the changing 
world.”52
« UW, p. 27.
53 Bhikkhu filanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddbitt Thought (Kandy: Buddhist 
Publication Society, 1971), p. 75.
54 MT, p. 123.
55 MT, p. 119.
56 Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (La Salle, Hl.: Open Court Publishing 
Co., 1962), p. 240.
57 Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reawn (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958,paper­
back ed.) p. 2.
58 Quoted in UW, p. 155.
The function of reason in both Whitehead and Buddhism is to foster the 
ultimate momentum of life, the growth of quality in experience. Both philo­
sophies realize that reason in the vast majority of people is convention-bound, 
ego-dominated by those who are “complacently perched on their cozy con­
ceptual superstructures regarding the world.”53 Both appreciate the possibility 
that concepts often become a bonding agent tying individuals more securely 
to things as they are, rather than luring them into fresh penetrations which 
stir and stimulate the depths of human experience.54 As it is pursued by 
Nagaijuna, indeed, in the evocative manner, reason can sometimes touch the 
spark of an original venture far beyond the limits words and concepts can 
ever convey, inciting in the thinker an “appetition for creation.”55 Hartshorne 
puts the issue in remarkable clarity in the following words: “Understanding 
must justify itself by enriching the present.... Understanding should mean 
a higher mode of existence.... Something is wrong if understanding robs us 
of peace in the present, only so that we may, given luck, prolong our anxious 
existence into old age.”56 This is what Whitehead intended. “The function of 
reason,” he argued, “is to promote the art of life.”57 Whitehead’s remark to 
Russell in this connection deserves to be more widely known. “You think,” 
Whitehead said, “that the world is what it looks like in fine weather at noon 
day; I think it is what it seems like in the early morning when one first wakes 
from deep sleep.”58 “Clear, conscious discrimination is an accident of human 
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existence. It makes us human. But it does not make us exist. It is of the 
essence of our humanity. But it is an accident of our existence.”59 It is certainly 
some sort of human arrogance to believe that the continuing advance of the 
universe into novelty could ever be expected to come within the range of 
human understanding. Overwhelmingly, human reason becomes an instru­
ment used by the power structures as man’s invisible stockade. Only by ac­
cident, and chiefly in their own solitariness, a relatively few fortunate ones 
discover that most of what their minds and speech contain is shallow and 
superficial rubbish of irrelevant detail.60 In this both Buddhist and Process 
Philosophies agree.
w MT, p. 116.
60 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion m the Afaiwg (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 
1926), p. 134.
What distinguishes Buddhism from Process Thought much more than the 
function of reason is the Buddhist process of purification, of which there is 
no Whiteheadian analogy. Not even philosophers are free from what Bud­
dhism calls the “overpowering forces” and “general defilements” that 
mutilate, suppress, scatter, and distort the natural rhythm of creativity 
flowing silendy through our lives. Within the philosopher’s interior land­
scape there are obstacles which in the last resort are his own invention, making 
it far more difficult than Western philosophers seem to think to pursue the 
practical, critical behavior that is the trademark of their concerns. Relative 
to men and women outside the profession, philosophers indeed are often more 
susceptible to the four “overpowering forces” which can only be mentioned 
here in passing: forced being (bbapa), wrong or dogmatic view (diabt), sensual­
ity (kama), and general ignorance (avijja). They are in all likelihood less con­
cerned than other people to pursue any rigorous discipline of meditation 
designed to bring their emotional life under rational control, and they share 
with other people in lesser degree an infection with “the three basic ills”: 
greed (raga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (mobd). They are possibly somewhat 
evenly divided on the question of whether or not self-corrective, purifying 
power is, on the whole, subject to rational control or comes from beyond 
conscious awareness when required conditions are provided. They are less 
likely than others to accept the assertion of Buddhism that the attempt to 
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dislodge concepts, or subject them to radical correction at the purely intel­
lectual level leads to infinite regress in thought.61
41 Bhikkhu Ranananda, op. tit., pp. 73-84.
62 CPP, Vol. v, par. 386. Some of the essential features of Buddhist philosophy are 
found in Peirce’s thought, for example, surprising penetrations from time to time into 
his own assumptions, repeated and almost unceasing drives beyond the limits of current 
forms of understanding, and the impossibility of pressing his thought into any kind of 
ideological mold. The following may serve as a tiny sampling: “Hume gave rise to all 
modern philosophy of every kind” (Vol. vm, par. 34); of all things, one thing is “infinitely 
more wonderful; it is that protoplasm feels” (Vol. vi, par. 255); and this, “experience 
is not what analysis discovers but the raw material upon which analysis works” (Vol. 
vu, par. 536). Perhaps the most provocative thought is his persuasion that most philo­
sophical posturing concerning doubt is false and artificial; doubt represents a change in 
the total pervasive nexus of events in which the mind is active. See Vol. v, pars. 421,443, 
575> 373 > 37tf> vi, pars. 6,499, vm, par. 206. “But do you call it doubting to write down on 
a piece of paper that you doubt? If so, doubt has nothing to do with any serious business” 
(v, pars. 416-417).
These remarks about the possible Buddhist contribution to a more creative 
philosophical profession are not, I think, too severe. Peirce, possibly America’s 
greatest philosopher of logic and science, died in poverty and debt, ignored 
by the “mandarins” of Boston, his unconventional creativity and divergent 
thinking even taxing at times the sympathy of his good friend, William 
James. “Wherever you are,” Peirce wrote, “let it be known that you seriously 
hold a tabooed belief, and you may be perfectly sure of being treated with a 
cruelty no less brutal but more refined than hunting you like a wolf. Thus, 
the greatest intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared, and dare 
not now, to utter the whole of their thought.”62 The Spanish philosopher, 
Ortega y Gasset, saw this issue more broadly as follows: “Whoever is not like 
everybody, does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated.” 
The ratio among philosophers is possibly not different from the ratio within 
the population at large in their willingness to follow the evidence wherever it 
leads, particularly when it leads them into the solitude where the distractions 
and the rootlessness of their lives may be flooded with the promise at least 
of creative renewal.
The struggle, and what Nagarjuna calls “the living thirst” for our own roots 
in the creativity that “drives the world” is fought on two fronts: first, against 
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the system of conceptual habits that reflect the intellectual and physical 
furniture of our convention-bound world; and, second, against the craving, 
grasping, ego-centered possessiveness that seem unconsciously for the most 
part to make everything and every thought exclusively “mine,” decisively 
mt another*;. Both types of struggle become increasingly intense as individuals 
feel themselves caught in the drives of a superimposed ego and its counter­
part,63 the encapsulated culture world they call home. From a Buddhist 
perspective, therefore, a fundamental irrationalism has seemed to dominate 
the life styles of man everywhere on earth, even of those most committed to 
the life of reason. As regards the cultures of affluence now dominant, it is 
simply incredible to any Buddhist that men and women should be so com­
pulsively devoted to living primarily as a consumer that prosperity and some 
kind of ill-defined “Progress” should be considered “essential to intelligent 
life,”64 as even George Herbert Mead seems to have believed. Cultures of 
affluence threaten the creativity which Buddhism and Process Philosophy 
insist is what life is all about. When one remembers that, as Wieman and 
Bergson especially liked to say, “quality is equivalent to energy and power 
at the human level,” we are speaking here about a pathological threat to the 
very source of the creativity that drives the world. It is strange to observe 
that in the present struggle between world powers there seems to be no 
realization that the resources capable of sustaining a complex civilization are 
centered in the live nexus of individualized feelings, in the flow of quality 
through the neural networks of the living moment, and in the creative 
sharing of this qualitative flow. Among Process Philosophers, Hartshorne seems 
unique in perceiving that such radical displacement of quality is destructive 
to human life because it turns that life upside down, ruins the value we find 
in living, and evacuates the “affirmation of worth that is life itself.”65
63 Bhikkhu bJ an ananda, op. cir., p. n.
64 George Herbert Mead, Mojwbctj/j of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. M. H. 
Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 363.
« CSPM, p. 317.
Creativity in the Buddhist perspective is not, therefore, an abstruse topic 
for philosophical debate. It is the most practical issue of our time, an issue 
that faces everyone at every moment, usually without breaking into conscious
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thought. “It is the wisdom of our lives,” Wieman wrote in one of his last 
books, “to recognize that, to the degree to which we refuse to live for this 
creativity, we are moving toward our own self-destruction.”66
w Henry Nelson Wieman, RtligiQiu Inquiry (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 39.
67 WP, p. 130.
It is a strange anomaly that mankind at both ends of his long struggle out 
of bestiality into civilization has difficulty discovering how to safeguard his 
roots in the creativity that prepared his way, because he first lacks sufficient 
experience, and later builds the towers that will come to claim more and 
more of his energy for their maintenance and defense. At both ends of 
the human time span, at the relatively unawakened and at the most fully 
developed, the power of creative process moving silently through the passing 
moment, appropriating and synthesizing experiences into novel forms of 
togetherness, tends to be threatened with suffocation.
It is possible to experience some measure of hope for the future, however, 
in the confluence of the Buddhist perspective with the recent work of Hart­
shorne and Whitehead, particularly on the cocreative character of man’s life 
in the world, on his continuity with the rest of life as an organic part of all 
that is alive, and on his inescapable interrelatedness, therefore, with the 
earth’s tender crust, the soil, minerals, air, food, population, disease, and the 
rest of the features of existence. Particularly is this to be viewed as a positive 
gain when behind Hartshorne and Whitehead we perceive so great a host of 
witnesses, beginning with Charles Darwin, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Ernst 
Heinrich Haeckel, Claude Bernard, Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Henry Wieman and many thou­
sands now feeding on their most difficult and profound penetrations. It is a 
sobering thought to remember that in the entire list only Hartshorne has 
read deeply in the Buddhist orientation and has been urging repeatedly that 
in Whitehead, especially, philosophy in this country has finally “found its way 
to a view which was first clearly formulated two thousand years and more 
earlier by the Buddhists, with their ‘no-soul, no-substance’ doctrine.”67 Be­
cause of its probable intimation of some convergence between East and West 
in levels far deeper than conscious thought, it is worth noting that the 
similarities between Whitehead and Buddhist perspectives appear in one who
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not only knew very little about Buddhism but was largely mistaken in what 
he “knew,” as research by Kenneth Inada recently has shown.68
69 Govind C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism (University of Allahabad, 1957), 
p. 251.
70 Ibid., p. 328.
When we have more historical information regarding the formative period 
of Buddhist philosophy, we may understand why at least some of the similari­
ties were able to surface then and now, despite the radically different stages 
of human development, linguistic systems, and geopolitical considerations 
involved. We shall also have more insight into why Buddhism should be a 
far more unrelenting adversary of the affluent society than any modem philo­
sopher could effectively become and continue to communicate with members 
of his own profession and culture, and why Buddhism stands closer to Marxism 
than to Process Philosophy in terms of the famous “thesis on Feuerbach”; 
namely, that philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways, 
while the point is to change it.
For those who find any historical parallels between the formative period 
of Buddhism and our own a simply incredible suggestion, it can be said that 
India then, as always, was being tested in its capacity to achieve that Pande 
calls the “progressive synthesis” for which Indian civilization has always 
struggled. Amid numerous linguistic, racial, ethnic, and religious traditions, 
India was then, as now, “seeking unity in the midst of an unending and 
bewildering diversity, and peace and harmony in the midst of struggle and 
conflict.”69 The age of the Buddha was marked by clashes between opposing 
“schools and sects and basic points of view” which fed the flame of spiritual 
quest. “At the same time it was an age of frequent and bloody wars and of 
much economic change. These circumstances must have created a feeling of 
distress and despair in the minds of many.”70 The polarization and fragmenta-
68 Kenneth Inada, “Whitehead’s ‘actual entit/ and the Buddha’s andtman,” Philosophy 
East and West, Vol. xxi (July 1971), p. 303. The errors Inada finds Whitehead consistently 
making are as follows: (1) that Buddhism has a savior just as Christianity, (2) that “the 
souls of the blessed return to God,” (3) that the sense of active personal participation is 
discouraged in Buddhism, (4) that Buddhism includes moral aims “directed to altering 
the first principles of metaphysics,” and (5) that ultimate reality is centered in a Bud­
dhist Absolute, with the multiplicity of finite enduring individuals relegated to a world
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tion of life in the superindustrial age had its counterpart in the continuous 
effort of India to cope with the conflicting races and cultures that have marked 
her long history. Against this background, certain features of the Buddha’s 
character stand out in ways that resemble some of the leading Process Philo­
sophers. He was independent of mind, seeking to substitute a “profoundly 
based critical attitude” for the dogmatism of opposing traditions. “He re­
cognized certain problems to be logically indeterminate and on these preserved 
silence. He was very practical. He wanted action and not mere speculation.... 
The greatness of Buddha’s personality is manifest from the fact that no other 
individual has left as strong an impression on the history of Indian culture 
as he.”7*
Whatever the parallels between that time and our own, the confluence of 
the two traditions yields novel consequences that must be noted in closing. 
Man is not here, both Buddhist and Process Philosophy assert, to dominate 
other forms of life. He is not here to control the rest of nature for his own 
ends. The Buddhist position is extreme on this point: “any action which aims 
at any advantage whatever in the present life is bad.”71 2 Man is not the center 
of creation. He and all his experience, what Dewey called “the funded ex­
perience of the race,” are part of the vast interrelatedness of all things. He is 
capable beyond all other forms of life of understanding this and of celebrating 
the creativity that runs through his nerve endings. This is the secret hidden 
in his largely unawakened and underdeveloped state. Amid the confluence of 
radically different culture worlds rubbing abrasively against one another in 
our own time, it is the legacy of the Buddhist tradition that lures and em­
powers us to ask a question Process Philosophy has never decisively asked, the 
question of why man clings so tenaciously, why he displays such compulsive 
attachment to the shallow back-water, at the very moment when unprecedent­
ed and unpredictable “shared creative experience” beckons almost irresistibly 
toward a higher mode of existence.
71 Ibid., pp. 391-393.
72 Quoted in Louis de la Vallee Poussin, The Way to (Cambridge: The Univer­
sity Press, 1917), p. 5.
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